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IMPEDIMENTS TO ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE:
THE INEQUITIES OF THE MARYLAND STANDING
DOCTRINE
DANIEL W. INGERSOLL IV*
I. INTRODUCTION: THE MARYLAND STANDING DILEMMA
The doctrine of standing is the gatekeeper to any citizen suit
against a regulatory agency. In order to seek judicial review of an
agency decision, like a permit grant, an individual must show an injury
that can be redressed by the court. Standing, as a doctrine, is a basic
safeguard for the separation of powers, ensuring that courts do not
decide cases that should be addressed by the legislative branch or
through political processes.
In Maryland, antiquated and overly strict standing requirements
ensure that the gates to the courthouse remain locked to many
individuals who would have standing in a federal or another state's
court. In particular, Maryland's associational standing requirements
limit standing to potential plaintiffs with the economic or political
means and inclination to file suit, thus creating an inequitable
distribution of procedural benefits. This inequitable distribution is the
source of serious environmental injustice among economically
disadvantaged classes.
This article surveys and compares Maryland's standing laws to
federal requirements and the requirements of other states. Section II
gives a brief history of the standing doctrine and its purpose, followed
by Section III, which describes federal standing requirements as well
as the requirements of several other states. Section IV outlines the
statutory landscape of the Environmental Title of the Maryland Code
and also its common law interpretation, showing the complexity and
inchoate nature of Maryland's standing doctrine. The analysis section
examines these disparate standing requirements in light of the theory
of environmental justice, and discusses legislation that is currently
underway to remedy the inequities.
* Daniel Winthrop Ingersoll IV is a student at the University of Maryland School of
Law.
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II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE STANDING DOCTRINE
The Standing Doctrine derives from the simple principle that
only those individuals with active complaints should have their cases
heard and decided by the courts. In the United States, the organic
language for standing comes from the "Cases and Controversies"
clause of Article III of the Constitution.' From this simple declaration,
the United States Supreme Court has expounded a complex and self-
imposed set of requirements for when a case or controversy is
justiciable.2
Compared to the English common law, the American notion of
standing is both fairly recent and unique. 3 Historically, the English
courts were open to almost all litigants, regardless of the nature or
temporality of their injury.4 This tradition continued into the colonial
period of the United States, with most courts open to issuing purely
advisory opinions.5 However, the framers of the United States
Constitution recognized a need to circumscribe the judiciary's power
through the new Federal Constitution.6 Today's standing doctrine
under federal law, which stems entirely from the Constitution, is seen
as an important mechanism by which the federal courts' non-
majoritarian views are held to certain specific instances.7
1. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. "The Judicial Power shall extend to all cases, in law and
equity, arising under the Constitution, the laws of the Unites States, and.., to controversies to
which the United States shall be a party; - to controversies between two or more states .
Id.
2. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750-51 (1984).
Standing doctrine embraces several judicially self-imposed limits on the
exercise of federal jurisdiction, such as the general prohibition on a
litigant's raising another person's legal rights, the rule barring adjudication
of generalized grievances more appropriately addressed in the
representative branches, and the requirement that a plaintiff's complaint
fall within the zone of interests protected by the law invoked.
Id.
3. See generally Philip Weinberg, Unbarring the Bar of Justice: Standing in
Environmental Suits and the Constitution, 21 PACE ENVTL. L. REv. 27 (2003) (discussing the
evolution of the standing doctrine).
4. Id. at 28-29.
5. Id. For a discussion about the prohibition on advisory opinions, see generally Plaut
v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211 (1995). Here, the United States Supreme Court
overturned a law that allowed the rehearing of previously adjudicated cases as violating the
rule against advisory opinions. Id. at 227 ("Having achieved finality, however, a judicial
decision becomes the last word of the judicial department with regard to a particular case or
controversy, and Congress may not declare by retroactive legislation that the law applicable to
that very case was something other than what the courts said it was." (emphasis in original)).
6. Id.
7. Allen, 468 U.S. at 750.
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Additionally, standing in its articulated constitutional form is a
recent, Twentieth Century creation. Previously, courts looked to
whether a plaintiff had a cause of action under the common law or
under a statute rather than applying a constitutional standing analysis.
8
The United States Supreme Court did not dismiss a case for lack of
standing until 1923 in Massachusetts v. Mellon,9 in which the Court
found that the plaintiffs lacked standing because of their taxpayer
status.10 The standing doctrine took further shape under the New Deal
as a way to "digest" the surfeit of cases arising under new
administrative regulations.'1 The essence of the standing principle was
codified under the Administrative Procedure Act of 194612 (APA),
which reads, "[A] person suffering legal wrong because of an agency
action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the
meaning of the relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof."' 13
While some form of the APA has been adopted by most states,
including Maryland, 14 the definition of an "aggrieved" person is
subject to the standing principles of state and federal courts, which are
discussed more thoroughly in subsequent sections.
All of the Doctrines that cluster about Article III - not only standing but
mootness, ripeness, political question, and the like - relate in part, and in
different though overlapping ways, to an idea, which is more than an
intuition but less than a rigorous and explicit theory, about the
constitutional and prudential limits to the powers of an unelected,
unrepresentative judiciary in our kind of government.
Id. (quoting Vander Jagt v. O'Neill, 699 F.2d 1166, 1178-79 (D.C. Cir. 1983)). See also supra
note 2 and accompanying text.
8. See Robert V. Percival & Joanna B. Goger, Escaping the Common Law's Shadow:
Standing in the Light of Laidlaw, 12 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 119,121 (2001).
9. 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
10. Weinberg, supra note 3, at 30.
11. Percival & Goger, supra note 8, at 122 ("Standing first emerged as a distinct legal
concept during the New Deal period as courts struggled to digest a flood of new regulatory
leakilation.").
12. Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 5 U.S.C.).
13. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 7 (1994) (emphasis added). See also
Percival & Goger, supra note 8, at 123.
14. See generally Administrative Procedure Act, MD. CODE ANN., STATE Gov'T §§ 10-
101 to -305 (1999).
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III. FEDERAL AND CROSS-STATE COMPARISON OF STANDING
REQUIREMENTS
Before discussing the minutiae of Maryland's "associational
standing" law, this section outlines the basic concepts adopted by the
Supreme Court regarding standing in general, standing under
environmental statutes, and associational standing. Though the
Supreme Court has vacillated between lenient and strict standing
requirements, associational standing has never been as restrictive at the
federal level as it is in Maryland. 15 Additionally, this section examines
the practice of Maryland's neighboring states of adopting the federal
requirements for individual and group standing. It is only in light of
the federal requirements for standing that the inadequacies of
Maryland law stand in stark relief.
A. The Federal Standard
The issue of environmental standing combines areas of
administrative law, individual standing, and organizational standing.
The following sections describe these elements at the federal level,
beginning with the general, constitutional requirements of standing,
proceeding to standing requirements that are specific to environmental
cases, and concluding with standing requirements that apply to
environmental groups and groups in general.
1. General Requirements
In general, there are two components of standing -
constitutional and prudential. As stated above, constitutional standing
derives from Article III of the Constitution.' In order to meet the
Court's constitutional requirement, a plaintiff must demonstrate the
following: 1) Injury in fact - the plaintiff must claim a personal
injury; 2) Causation - the injury must be fairly traceable to the
allegedly wrongful conduct of the defendant; and 3) Redressability -
the court must be able to redress the injury. 17 The second component
of standing is the prudential requirement, which includes the rarely
15. See infra Part V.A.
16. See supra note I and accompanying text.
17. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984) (plaintiffs, parents of African-American
students bringing a class action against the Internal Revenue Service for failing to deny tax
benefits to private schools practicing discrimination, were unable to show injury in fact).
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used "zone of interest" standard, a prohibition against filing suits for
generalized grievances, or bringing a claim on behalf of a third party.' 
8
An injury under Article III is a shifting and incorporeal
standard that greatly depends on the case law in a particular
jurisdiction.' 9 For example, an injury recognized by the Supreme
Court varies depending on the type of injury incurred, as well as the
type of relief sought (i.e., past harms to plaintiffs may not satisfy
standing for a suit seeking future relief unless future injury is very
likely).20 This becomes particularly important in environmental cases
where often the only injury involved is aesthetic and difficult to locate
in a particular person.2' Though courts have attempted to isolate
concrete criteria for standing in environmental cases, a successful
approach is often elusive because, as Justice O'Connor wrote in her
majority opinion in Allen v. Wright, "[tihe constitutional component of
standing doctrine incorporates concepts concededly not susceptible of
precise definition. . . . [T]he terms ['distinct and palpable' injury]
cannot be defined so as to make application of the constitutional
standing requirement a mechanical exercise. 23 Justice O'Connor




Standing under environmental statutes emerged from the New
Deal and the APA. 25 In order to encourage citizen enforcement of new
18. Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 113-14 (1976) (holding that because a sufficient
connection existed between two physicians and their patients, the physicians could sue on
behalf of the patients). See also Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 12
(2004) (citing Allen, 468 U.S. at 751).
19. See infra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
20. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102 (1982). This case involved a man
who was injured by a police chokehold during an arrest. Id. at 98. The Court held that there
was an actual injury, but no present case or controversy for the injunctive relief sought
because of the plaintiff's inability to demonstrate a likelihood of future injury. Id. at 105-06.
21. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972). In this case, the Court
recognized the impracticability of the traditional standing test requiring "legal interest" and
"legal wrong" in holding that "injury in fact," i.e., aesthetic wellbeing, was sufficient for
standing under the Administrative Procedure Act. Id. at 733.
22. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992). Here, plaintiffs were
unable to show that their plans to stuoy endangered animals i , iu mutuiv w,,z ,i,,, and
particularized" or "actual or imminent." Id. at 564.
23. Allen, 468 U.S. at 751.
24. Id. ("In many cases the standing question can be answered chiefly by comparing the
allegations of the particular complaint to those made in prior standing cases.").
25. Percival & Goger, supra note 8, at 126-29.
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environmental laws, the Clean Air Act of 1970,26 and most subsequent
environmental acts all included citizen-friendly judicial review
requirements. 27 This encouragement of citizen suits recognized "the
difficulty of getting government bureaucracies to respond to
environmental concerns.,
28
The pendulum of case law defining standing under
environmental statutes has swung back and forth over the past three
decades. Justice Scalia's majority opinion in Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife2 9 in 1991 reined in those seeking standing to bring claims
under federal environmental statutes. There, environmental
organizations challenged a decision by the Secretary of the Interior to
implement a regulation alleged to be outside the "geographic scope" of
the Endangered Species Act. Having identified the "injury" prong as
the pertinent issue in environmental standing cases, the Court
determined that the alleged injury must be "concrete and
particularized," and "actual or imminent - not 'conjectural' or
'hypothetical.' 30 In doing so, the Court created a high bar for standing
under the Act, holding that the plaintiffs must have "concrete" plans to
study or benefit from the endangered species in the future in order to
show an injury in fact.3 1 While the Court continued to recognize that
its previous holdings allowed "purely aesthetic purposes" as
cognizable interests for the purpose of standing,32 it clarified that a
plaintiff with standing must also show concrete future plans to enjoy
those aesthetic benefits.
33
This holding produced a line of cases with negative results for
environmental groups. One important example, Public Interest
Research Group New Jersey v. Magnesium Elektron,34 involved a
chemical company that admitted to violating its Clean Water Act
permit 123 times by discharging zirconium carbonate into the
Delaware River.35 The Third Circuit held that the plaintiffs did not
26. 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a)(1) (2007).
27. Percival & Goger, supra note 8, at 129 ("Congress added citizen-suit provisions to
virtually all the major federal environmental laws to ensure that they were implemented and
enforced.").
28. Id.
29. 504 U.S. 555 (1991).
30. Id. at 560 (citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 508 (1975); Sierra Club v. Morton,
405 U.S. 727, 740-41 (1972); and Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990)).
31. Id. at 564.
32. Id. at 562-63 (citing Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 734).
33. Id.
34. 123 F.3d 111 (3d Cir. 1997).
35. Id. at 115.
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have standin under Lujan because they did not show injury to the
environment, 36 and because "knowledge of pollution," which caused
several plaintiffs to cease water activities, was insufficient to show
injury to the plaintiffs. 37
The standard set by Lujan was relaxed, however, by the
Court's decision in Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw, Inc.38 Similar to
the chemical company in Magnesium Elektron, the defendant in this
case - a hazardous waste incinerator in South Carolina - was
accused of violating its Clean Water Act permit by dumping mercury
into the North Tyger River.39 In allowing a citizen suit claim brought
under the Clean Water Act, the Court held that the plaintiff need only
show an injury to the plaintiff, not an injury to the environment n° and
that evidence of reduced use of the affected environment by the
plaintiffs was enough to establish standing. 41 The Court thus returned
to a requirement for federal environmental standing similar to that
established by the 1972 case, Sierra Club v. Morton.
4 2
Currently, plaintiffs alleging injuries from polluters under
federal law can invoke the standards of Friends of the Earth v.
Laidlaw, Inc; however, recent appointments to the Supreme Court
raise many questions about the future of environmental standing.
Justice Alito, who heard oral argument for the first time on February
21, 2006, took part in the decision in Magnesium Elektron,43 and could
potentially steer the Court back towards decisions akin to Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife.
3. Associational Standing
Associational standing at the federal level is well established
and parallels individual standing requirements. One early
interpretation by the Supreme Court regarding associational standing is
Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commission.44 Here, the
36. Id. at 121 ("[Plaintiff] PIRG's members do not allege in their complaint or affidavits
any injury to the Delaware River.").
37. Id. at 120 ("PIRG's knowledge that MEI exceeded the effluent limits set by its
NPDES permit does not, by itself, demonstrate injury or threat of injury.").
38. 528 U.S. 167 (2000).
39. Id. at 175-76.
40. Id. Here the Court overturned the deleterious standard that was used in Magnesium
Elektron: "'tje relevant showing for purposes oi 11 title lli, hwe i nilirbt
the environment but injury to the plaintiff." Id. at 180.
41. Id. at 183.
42. See id. See also 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
43. See, e.g., supra notes 34-37 and accompanying text.
44. 432 U.S. 333 (1977).
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Washington State apple industry, through the Advertising
Commission, challenged an administrative rule by the North Carolina
Board of Agriculture.45 The Court held that the Association had
standing, 46 finding that an association may bring suit on behalf of its
members when: 1) at least one member of the organization would have
standing to sue in his or her own right; 2) the interest it seeks to protect
is "germane" to the organization's purpose; and 3) the claim asserted
and the relief requested does not require the participation of the
individual members.
47
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has applied the
requirements for associational standing espoused in Hunt in actions
arising under the APA. For example, in Friends of the Earth v. Gaston
Copper,48 a case involving judicial review of a permit violation of the
Clean Water Act, the Fourth Circuit adopted the criteria used in Hunt
to determine if the plaintiff had standing under the Act's citizen suit
provision.49 Furthermore, in 1000 Friends of Maryland v. Browner,50 a
case involving a challenge to an administrative determination under
the Clean Air Act, the Fourth Circuit again applied the Hunt criteria
and determined that members of the plaintiff organization had injuries
that satisfied the requirements of Friends of the Earth, Inc. v.
Laidlaw.51
B. Cross-State Comparison
Many states have adopted the federal Article III standing
requirements in one way or another. Some state courts have integrated
the Hunt requirements into their common law, while others (usually
states with comprehensive environmental codes) have made this
change statutorily.52 Although the Maryland General Assembly
attempted to adopt similar changes through the Maryland
Environmental Standing Act (MESA)§3 in order to circumvent the
harsh common law discussed infra, those efforts have been fruitless
45. Id. at 335.
46. Id. at 343.
47. Id. (citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 511 (1975)).
48. 204 F.3d 149 (4th Cir. 2000).
49. Id. at 155.
50. 256 F.3d 216 (4th Cir. 2001).
51. Id. at 225-26.
52. See, e.g., Med. Waste Assocs., Inc. v. Md. Waste Coal., Inc., 612 A.2d 241, 252-53
(Md. 1992).
53. MD. CODE ANN., NAT. REs. §§ 1-501 to -508 (2000).
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because MESA does not afford a right of judicial review.14 This
section discusses the various changes that some of Maryland's
neighbors have made over the years to supplement traditional
environmental standing for associations.
Several states have acts similar to MESA; however, in almost
every such state other than Maryland, state legislatures have taken care
to include judicial review of agency decisions under their provisions.
These states include Michigan, 5 Florida,5 6 Connecticut,
57 Minnesota,5 8
and South Dakota.59 The General Assembly of Maryland, in
promulgating MESA, aspired to relieve Maryland citizens of the
hardships associated with overly-strict environmental standing.
60
However, the poor drafting and contradictory language of the Act
prevent Marylanders from enjoying the same rights as the states listed
above because they have no right to judicial review of alleged
violations of the Act.
While other states have not taken specific steps to codify
environmental standing, many states, including New York and
Pennsylvania, have adopted the federal Article III standing
requirements into their common law and have applied them to
regulatory decisions that affect the environment. In Society of the
Plastics Industry v. County of Suffolk,6 ' the plastics industry
challenged a county government's decision to ban the use of plastic
grocery bags in stores, and the Court of Appeals of New York applied
federal associational standing requirements. 62 Similarly, in National
54. See infra note 87 and accompanying text.
55. Michigan was the first state to adopt such an Act in 1970. See Med. Waste, 612 A.2d
at 252; Michigan Environmental Protection Act, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 691.1205 (1979),
repealed by MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 324.1701 (West 1995). See also Kimberly C. Strasser,
Environmental Law, 52 MD. L. REV. 673, 677-78 (1993) (noting that Michigan was the
seminal state in providing for increased citizen protection in environmental suits).
56. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 403.412 (West 2002) ("No demonstration of special injury
different in kind from the general public at large is required.").
57. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-19 (West Supp. 2006).
58. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 116B.09 (West 2005).
59. See S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34A-10-2 (1999).
60. The Court of Appeals in Medical Waste determined that the legislative history of
MESA "sheds little light on the intent of the General Assembly," despite the language of
section 1-502 of MESA, which includes the following legislative finding: "the courts of the
State of Maryland are an appropriate forum for seeking the protection ot the environment and
an unreasonably strict procedural definition of 'standing to sue' in environmental matters is
not in the public interest." See Med. Waste, 612 A.2d. at 250 (citing MD. CODE ANN., NAT.
RES. § 1-502 (1989)).
61. 573 N.E.2d 1034 (N.Y. 1991).
62. Id. at 1041 (citing Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737,751 (1984)).
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Solid Wastes Management Association v. Casey,63 the Commonwealth
Court of Pennsylvania found that an association may have standing
"solely as the representative of its members." 64
Virginia, who shares the Chesapeake Bay with Maryland, has
not created an environmental standing act and has common law
standing rules that, in their strictness, are similar to Maryland's
standing rules. 65 However, Virginia has supplemented the state
environmental titles to include Article III standing on an ad hoc
basis.66 While Maryland has a similar provision under its Ambient Air
Quality Control title,67 this is an isolated section that has generated no
significant case law in its short tenure. Virginia's environmental
provisions, on the other hand, cover a vast array of subtitles, thus
having a significant effect on standing. 68
IV. MARYLAND STANDING REQUIREMENTS
This section outlines standing barriers facing the environmental
advocate in Maryland who wishes to seek judicial review of an
administrative decision, such as permit or zoning decisions that
allegedly violate the organic statutes. The first part provides a
description of the statutory landscape that defines the standing issue,
including the Administrative Procedure Act,69  the Maryland
Environmental Standing Act, 70 Title 66B for zoning,71 and the
72Ambient Air Quality standard. The second part describes how these
63. 580 A.2d 893 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1990).
64. Id. at 899.
65. See, e.g., Health Sys. Agency of N. Va. v. Stroube, 623 S.E.2d 444, 449-50 (Va. Ct.
App. 2005).
66. See VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-1457 (West 2006); VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-44.29 (West
2001).
67. MD. CODE ANN., ENVIR. § 2-404.1 (1993). See also infra note 98 and accompanying
text.
68. The Virginia Code has two sections that adopt Article III standing specifically.
Comparatively, whereas Maryland's Ambient Air Quality title is exclusive to ambient air, MD.
CODE ANN., ENVIR. § 2-404.1, the two sections of the Virginia code cover all matters of waste
management, such as solid waste, landfills, hazardous waste, and radioactive waste (VA. CODE
ANN. § 10.1-1457) and almost all water pollution provisions under "Waters of the State, Ports
and Harbors" (VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-44.29). See, e.g., State Water Control Bd. v. Crutchfield,
578 S.E.2d 762, 767 (Va. 2003); Chesapeake Bay Found. v. Commonwealth, 616 S.E.2d 39,
43 (Va. Ct. App. 2005).
69. MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T § 10-101 (1999).
70. MD. CODE ANN., NAT. RES. §§ 1-501 to -508 (2000).
71. MD. CODE ANN., Art. 66B § 1.02(a) (1988).
72. MD. CODE ANN., ENVR. § 2-404.1.
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already narrow rules have been given a very narrow reading by the
Court of Appeals.
A. The Statutory Landscape
The Environmental Article of the Maryland Code establishes
the Department of the Environment, 73 which is headed by the
Secretary of the Environment. 74 The Secretary is under the ultimate
authority of the Governor of Maryland, who in turn defines the state's
environmental policies. 75 The Environmental Article establishes the
legal requirements for air quality, water quality, coal mining, wetlands
regulation, sanitation, and much more.
1. The Administrative Procedure Act
Many standing issues under the Environmental Article refer to
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), which is codified in the
76State Government Article of the Maryland Code. The "Definitions"
section of the Environmental Article requires that contested cases be
determined under the rules of the APA.77 This requirement affects
most sections of the code through a provision of the Environmental
Article - section 5-204(a) of the Water Resources Title. 78 Section 5-
204 directs a huge swath of titles and subtitles of the Environmental
Article to the APA by reference to the "contested case" procedures.79
Additionally, several provisions of the Environmental Article refer to
the APA directly, including Sediment Control, 8°  Stormwater
Management, 81 and Water Pollution.
82
73. MD. CODEANN., ENVIR § 1-401 (1993).
74. MD. CODE ANN., ENVIR § 1-402 (1993).
75. Id.
76. MD. CODEANN., STATE GOV'T § 10-101 (1999).
77. This section of the code defines a contested case as "an adjudicatory hearing in
accordance with the contested case procedures of Subtitle 2 of the Maryland Administrative
Procedure Act." MD. CODE ANN., ENVIR. § 1-101(b) (1993).
78. The pertinent language of section 5-204 reads as follows: "It is the intent of the
General Assembly to establish consolidated procedures and notice and hearing requirements
for Title 5, Subtitles 5 and 9 and Titles 14, 15, and 16 of this article in order to ensure efficient
review and consistent decision making." MD. CODE ANN., ENVIR § 5-204(a) (1993).
79. These titles and subtitles include, through cross-reterence: waters, Reservoirs, and
Dams; Non-Tidal Wetlands; Gas and Oil; Mines and Mining; and Wetlands and Riparian
Rights. MD. CODE ANN., ENVIR § 5-204 (a)(l).
80. MD. CODE ANN., ENVIR. § 4-115 (1993).
81. MD. CODE ANN., ENVIR. § 4-214 (1993).
82. MD. CODE ANN., ENVIR. § 9-340 (1993).
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As stated before, all of these portions of the Environmental
Article are subject to the procedures of the APA. The APA determines
those who are eligible to seek review of an agency decision by
Maryland courts through the following language: "a party who is
aggrieved by the final decision in a contested case is entitled to judicial
review of the decision as provided in this section." 83 The definition of
an aggrieved party is determined by Maryland common law, which is
discussed infra in Section B. It is this determination that has such a
profound effect on standing.
2. Maryland Environmental Standing Act
The Maryland Environmental Standing Act (MESA) 84 was
created in 1973 with the specific intention of loosening the common
law requirements for standing. Unlike the APA, which limits
standing to aggrieved parties, MESA expands standing to "[a]ny...
person, regardless of whether he possesses a special interest different
from that possessed generally by the residents of Maryland.,
86
However, MESA's broad standing requirements apply to an incredibly
limited field of remedies that does not include judicial review of an
agency action. 87 As a consequence, the Maryland Court of Appeals has
made MESA a dead letter in the Maryland Code.88 This consequence
runs counter to the General Assembly's intention at the time of
MESA'a creation that strict standing laws were (and still are) against
the public interest when it comes to environmental cases.
89
3. Article 66B (Zoning)
Standing is also difficult to attain under the general zoning
provisions of the State of Maryland. Article 66B of the Maryland Code
grants authority to local governments in the State to establish local
83. MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOv'T § 10-222(a)(1) (1999).
84. Maryland Environmental Standing Act, MD. CODE ANN., NAT. RES. §§ 1-501 to -508
(2000).
85. The General Assembly found that "the courts of the State of Maryland are an
appropriate forum for seeking the protection of the environment and that an unreasonably
strict procedural definition of 'standing to sue' in environmental matters is not in the public
interest." MD. CODE ANN., NAT. RES. § 1-502.
86. MD. CODE ANN., NAT. RES. § 1-503(a)(3).
87. See generally MD. CODE ANN., NAT. RES. §§ 1-501 to -508. While MESA
establishes several forms of relief, such as a writ of mandamus and equitable relief, MD. CODE
ANN., NAT. RES. § 1-503(b), the Court of Appeals in Medical Waste Associates, Inc. v.
Medical Waste Coalition, Inc. was quick to point out that judicial review was not one of the
actions created by the statute. 612 A.2d 241, 252 (Md. 1992).
88. Id.
89. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
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zoning plans. 90 Because local governments may determine the use and
classification of public and private lands,91 their decisions have an
immense impact on the environment.
Standing under Article 66B encompasses aggrieved parties and
"any taxpayer"; 92 however, Maryland courts have interpreted the
language of this code provision narrowly. The Court of Special
Appeals, for example, held in Committee for Responsible Development
on 25th Street v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore93 that in order
to qualify as an aggrieved party in an action challenging a zoning
decision, the challenger must be within sight or sound range of the
property that is subject to complaint.94
However, the limited implications of Article 66B for
environmental standing - given that 66B only applies to the five non-
charter counties in Maryland 95 - may not justify the significantly
greater effort that would be needed in order to change its standards.
All other counties are allowed to adopt their own zoning principles
with their own corresponding standing provisions. 96  Thus, an
amendment to Article 66B would only affect a few of the smallest
counties in the state, 97 and yet would likely bring every developer in
the state, an industry averse to environmental protection, out of the
woodwork to oppose it.
4. Ambient Air Quality
The Ambient Air Quality Control Title98 requires special
attention because it is the only provision of Maryland's Environmental
Code that specifically adopts federal Article III "case and controversy"
90. MD. CODE ANN., Art. 66B § 3.01(a) (1988).
91. MD. CODE ANN., Art. 66B § 3.05(a)(4)(ii)(1) (1988).
92. MD. CODE ANN., Art. 66B § 4.08(a)(1)(iii) (1988).
93. 767 A.2d 906 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2001).
94. See id. at 912.
95. See MD. CODE ANN., Art. 66B § 1.02(a) (1988).
96. The difference between a charter and a non-charter county in the state of Maryland
is defined in the Maryland Constitution. MD. CONST. art. XI-A, XI-F. These sections describe
the process by which counties either elect to form a charter, or adopt "home rule" in the case
of "code counties." Id. A code county has no charter, and is therefore subject to general
provisions of the Maryland Code, such as Article 66B. Id. See MD. CODE ANN., Art. 66B §
1.02(a). Because of the various forms of government available to Maryland counties, in depth
Rnnlwiv of their esoteric zoning requirements would be laborious and beyond the scope of this
article.
97. Out of Maryland's twenty-three counties, only five of them are still code counties:
Allegany, Caroline, Kent, Queen Anne's, and Worcester. See Allegany County Board of
County Commissioners, http://www.gov.allconet.org/bcc/quick-look.htm (last visited October
28, 2006).
98. MD. CODE ANN., ENVIR. §§ 2-101 to -901 (1993).
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standing requirements. The standing provision of the Ambient Air
Quality Title99 was adopted by the 2002 Acts and designed to emulate
the federal standing requirements. Here the language permits judicial
review for any person who meets federal constitutional law standing
requirements. 1
00
This section needs special attention for two reasons. First, the
new standing provision indicates the dissatisfaction of the federal
government over the Act's originally proposed standing requirements,
since the Maryland Department of the Environment lost federal
approval of its Ambient Air Quality standing requirements and was
forced to adopt federal requirements. 10 1 Second, at the time of this
writing, the language of this Title was the focus of discussion by the
General Assembly over amendments to the entire Environmental
Article. 1
02
B. Case Law Interpretation
The Maryland Court of Appeals' decision in Medical Waste
Associates, Inc. v. Medical Waste Coalition, Inc. 103 is its most in-depth
interpretation of the statutory layout described above. The plaintiff in
Medical Waste challenged a permit issued by the Department of the
Environment to Medical Waste Associates for the building of a
medical waste incinerator. 1°4 The Court of Appeals held that the
plaintiff environmental group, Medical Waste Coalition, did not have
standing to challenge the issuance of the permit because it did not have
an affected property interest separate and distinct from its members. 1
05
The court made several important determinations in regard to
standing. First, the court dismissed the claim under MESA, holding
that the Act does not "expressly include judicial review of an
administrative proceeding." In doing so, the Court of Appeals
99. See MD. CODE ANN., ENVIR. § 2-404.1 (limiting standing to those who "(1) [m]eet
the threshold standing requirements under federal constitutional law; and (2) Participated in a
public participation process through the submission of written or oral comments, unless an
opportunity for public participation was not required by statute or regulation.").
100. See id.
101. Act of May 16, 2002 Md. Laws ch. 437 (S.B. 248) (codified as amended MD. CODE
ANN., ENVIR. § 2-404.1), available at http://mlis.state.md.us.
102. See, e.g., S.B. 589, 2006 Leg., 421st Sess. (Md. 2006).
103. 612 A.2d 241 (Md. 1992).
104. Id. at 242.
105. Id. at 249-50.
106. To support this holding, the Court of Appeals looked to similar environmental
standing acts from other states that do include judicial review in their language. Some of these
states include Michigan, Connecticut, Florida and South Dakota. Id. at 252-53.
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restricted the expanded standing of MESA to include only mandamus
or declaratory actions against an agency or its members for failure to
perform a non-discretionary act. 107 Second, the court held that the
claim of the environmental group fell under the standing requirements
of the APA, °8 and that the definition of "aggrieved" under the APA is
determined by Maryland common law. 
109
In comparison to federal common law, the Court of Appeals
has more narrowly interpreted the definition of an "aggrieved" party
under Maryland common law. Maryland common law for standing,
like federal law, has separate requirements for individuals and
organizations. In Maryland, however, in order for an individual to
have standing, they must have a personal interest or property right that
is "specifically" affected in a way that is different from the public in
general.' 10 Thus, in Sugarloaf Citizens' Association v. Department of
Environment,"1 the Maryland Court of Appeals recognized standing
only for owners of land directly adjacent to a challenged solely
because their land was closer to the incinerator than the plaintiffs
found not to have standing. 112 In order for an organization or
association to have standing in Maryland, it must have a "property
interest of its own - separate and distinct from that of its individual
members." 113 Maryland common law therefore makes it very difficult
for associations to challenge administrative decisions in Maryland by
diverting attention away from the actual injury and instead focusing on
the differences between potential victims.
V. ANALYSIS
The standing doctrine is supposed to separate true
controversies under the law from generalized complaints that should
107. Id. at 251-52.
108. Id. at 248 ("We have determined that the administrative proceedings held in this
case were contested cases under the APA.").
109. Id. ("We have held that the statutory requirement that a party be 'aggrieved' mirrors
general common law standing principles ....") (citing Bryniarski v. Montgomery County
Court of Appeals, 247 Md. 137, 143-46 (19mt)).
110. Id.
111. 686A.2d605 (Md. 1996).
112. Id. at 620.
113. Med. Waste, 612 A.2d at 249 (quoting Citizens Planning and Hous. Ass'n v. County
Executive of Bait., 329 A.2d 681, 687 (Md. 1974)) (emphasis added).
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be remedied through the political process. 114 However, the standing
doctrine as it is applied in Maryland has created inequitable results.
Not only does Maryland require a higher threshold to establish a
judicially recognized "injury" than the federal government,115 it also
stands out among its neighboring states for its unreasonable standing
requirements. 116 The puzzling requirement that Maryland places on
associations for standing almost guarantees that individuals in lower
economic neighborhoods, where polluting entities often choose to
locate their sites, cannot enjoy the advocacy of organizations with the
resources and time to represent their claims. Thus, Maryland's
associational standing creates a significant barrier to environmental
justice. Though the true problem is in Maryland's common law,
attempts to remedy the standing problem statutorily have recently been
made by the General Assembly. While critics claim that expanded
judicial review will overburden the court system, these views are not
supported by evidence at the federal level. This analysis describes and
assesses those efforts, concluding that they are an appropriate step in
the right direction.
A. Maryland Group Standing Fails to Maintain Parity with Federal
Standards and Multi-state Trends
The most compelling rationale for amending Maryland's
standing law is that it is contrary to national trends at the federal and
state level. As stated above, significant differences exist for
associational standing under Maryland and Supreme Court analysis.1 1
7
Most importantly, Maryland law denies standing to an important sector
of interested parties - associations that would pass under the Federal
standard, simply because an association must have a property interest
separate and apart from its members." The Supreme Court, on the
other hand, only requires that one member of the association have
standing to sue in his or her own right. 119 Furthermore, while the injury
prong of individual standing has vacillated over the years in the
114. See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984) (noting that the case or
controversy requirement, along with ripeness, mootness, and political question, "defines" the
separation of powers doctrine in regards to the Judicial Branch) (citing Valley Forge Christian
Coll. v. Ams. United for the Separation of Church & State, 454 U.S. 464, 471-76 (1982)).
115. See infra Part V.A.
116. Id.
117. See supra Parts III.A.2-3, IV.B.
118. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
119. See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text.
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Supreme Court, 120  associational standing has been consistently
recognized. 121
Notwithstanding federal law, the trends of neighboring states,
and the direct assertion by the Maryland General Assembly that looser
standing requirements are in the public interest, 122 Maryland courts
have retained an overly-narrow view on standing. The environmental
titles of the Maryland Code, therefore, should be changed to relieve
Maryland citizens of a pernicious impediment to environmental
justice.
B. Maryland Group Standing Unnecessarily Restricts the Availability
of Procedural Remedies, and Stands as a Bar to Environmental Justice
Environmental justice is the theory that the burdens of
environmental harm should be distributed evenly across all aspects of
society, and should not affect certain classes, races, ethnicities, or
other groups disproportionately.123 This idea was articulated in 1994 in
an executive order by President Clinton. 124  Additionally, the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in 1998 defined
environmental justice as "[t]he fair treatment of people of all races,
cultures, incomes, and educational levels with respect to the
development and enforcement of environmental laws, regulations, and
policies."' 125 President Clinton's executive order and the EPA's
120. See supra Part III.A.2.
121. The Supreme Court has not revisited the law regarding group standing since Hunt v.
Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977).
122. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
123. Robert R. Kuehn, A Taxonomy of Environmental Justice, in ENVIRONMENTAL
JUSTICE: LAW, POLICY & REGULATION 6, 7 (Clifford Rechtschaffen & Eileen Guana eds.,
2003).
124. Exec. Order No. 12,898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7,629 (Feb. 11, 1994), amended by
Amendment to Exec. Order No. 12,898, 60 FR 6381 (Jan. 30, 1995). President Clinton's
Executive Order states, in pertinent part, the following:
To the greatest extent practicable ...each Federal agency shall make
achieving environmental justice part of its mission by identifying and
addressing ... disproportionately high and adverse human health or
environmental effects of its programs, policies, and activities on minority
populations and low-income populations in the United States ....
Id. See also Kuehn, supra note 123, at 7.
125. Kuehn, supra note 123, at 7. The EPA's most recent definition of environmental
just, though slightly clitterent, conveys the same message: 'tnvironmentai justice is the fair
treatment and meaningful involvement of all people regardless of race, color, national origin,
or income with respect to the development, implementation, and enforcement of
environmental laws, regulations, and policies." U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,
Environmental Justice, http://www.epa.gov/compliance/environmentaljustice/index.html (last
visited Apr. 3, 2007).
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definition took environmental justice beyond theory, and into a
cognizable public policy at the federal level.
As many scholars point out, there are many aspects and
dimensions of environmental justice depending on one's definition of
the terms "environment" and "justice." 26 Some common categories
include distributive justice and procedural justice. 127 The former refers
to the equitable distribution of environmental harms, while the latter
refers to the equal availability of procedural remedies. It is procedural
justice that frames the argument under which one must examine
environmental standing in Maryland.
1. Politics, Externalities, and the Importance of Procedural
Remedies to Environmental Justice
The danger of rigorous group standing requirements is
particularly relevant because the political activity of a community is a
factor when deciding the location of hazardous waste sites (i.e.
"siting"). A study performed by James Hamilton, for instance, found
that between 1987 and 1992, commercial hazardous waste firms, when
deciding where to increase hazardous waste capacity, were likely to
take into consideration a community's propensity for collective
action. 128 Under the Coase Theorem - the principle that firms will
locate where the cost to society is the least 129 - firms that produce
externalities should locate where the social costs are minimized
Hamilton notes, however, that "in a world where collective action is
variable," a firm may end up locating its facility where social costs are
high, but the firm's costs are low due to lack of community
opposition.' Such sitting decisions could be a measure of social costin that the non-litigious nature of a community may be due to a lack of
126. Kuehn, supra note 123, at 6.
127. See id. at 8. See also Vicki Been, What's Fairness Got to Do With It? Environmental
Justice and the Sitting of Locally Undesirable Land Uses, in ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: LAW,
POLICY, & REGULATION, supra note 123, at 12.
128. James T. Hamilton, Politics and Social Costs: Estimating the Impact of Collective
Action on Hazardous Waste Facilities, 24 RAND J. ECON. 101, 121 (1993).
129. In other words, in an ideal world where property rights are perfectly defined, there
are no transaction costs, and people enjoy the right to be free of pollution, a firm "realizes that
it will have to pay its neighbors for the 'right' to pollute." Id. at 103. In making a decision as
to where to locate, a company will take into consideration the social costs on a certain
community, and locate where this cost is the least. Id.
130. Id. at 122.
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interest in the environment.1 31 However, the lack of community
opposition may also be explained by an inability to be litigious. 132
One obvious solution to the market's failure to internalize the
hidden social costs of the politically and legally inactive is
representation in the political process. 133 Theoretically, politically-
interested groups battle to have their voices heard and ultimately
produce public policies that "help correct market failures."
'1 34
Resolution through the political process, moreover, is also one of the
main constitutional arguments behind the standing doctrine.1 35 But
what happens when the political mechanism for enforcement becomes
complacent despite the adoption of sound environmental principles?
Maryland's group standing doctrine must be changed to mirror
federal standards so that environmental groups can assume the burden
of representing the politically and legally underrepresented, especially
given the reduced government enforcement of environmental
regulations. While it is no secret that enforcement of environmental
regulations at the national level has declined in recent years,
136
enforcement actions by the Maryland Department of the Environment
(MDE) have also decreased. 137 Between 2003 and 2005, enforcement
actions by the MDE decreased from approximately 2027 actions to
131. Id. at 102. After all, critics of environmental justice claim that inequitable siting
decisions are based on typical market forces. Robin Saha & Paul Mohai, Explaining Racial
and Socioeconomic Disparities in the Location of Locally Unwanted Land Uses: A Conceptual
Framework, in ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: LAW, POLICY, & REGULATION , supra note 123, at
34. One such argument states that "[d]isproportionate siting ...occur[s] because cost-
effective industrial areas with low property values are also likely to be nearby areas with low
residential property values." Id. Thus, critics attempt to distance the environmental justice
argument from sensitive notions of race and class by using the sterile market-force theory as
an explanation for the disparities.
132. Hamilton, supra note 128, at 102. Hamilton states that "[i]f areas vary in their
potential for collective action and thus their potential to organize politically to express their
demands, then a community's expressed opposition to a facility may be low, even though
residents strongly oppose it." Id. (emphasis in original). See also Saha & Mohai, supra note
131, at 34 ("[o]ne way of avoiding the high costs of citing delays or defeats is to select
communities where the likelihood of public opposition is reduced . . . .Evidence exists to
support the claim that middle-income, affluent, and better educated communities are better
equipped to wage effective opposition campaigns.").
133. Hamilton, supra note 128, at 104.
134. Id. (citing Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for
Political Influence, 98 Q. J. ECON. 371 (1983)).
135. See, e.g., supra note 114 and accompanying text.
136. James R. May, Now More than Ever: Trends in Environmental Citizen Suits at 30,
10 WIDENER L. REV. 1, 4-5 (2003).
137. See generally MARYLAND DEPARTMENT OF THE ENVIRONMENT, 2005 ANN.
ENFORCEMENT & COMPLIANCE REP. (n.d.) 1, available at http://www.mde.state.md.us/About
MDE/Reports/enforcementComp.asp.
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1221.138 Furthermore, MDE's total budget was reduced by three
percent, fewer penalties were collected, and inspections and audits
were reduced by more than 3000.139 During the same period, the
amount of pollution from coal-fired plants increased by three percent,
which translates to about 32,000 tons of pollution in one year.140
Worries that a relaxed standing requirement will inundate the
court system are unfounded. Critics of relaxed standing requirements
argue that the decision of Laidlaw has led to the over-representation of
self-interested environmental groups and the subsequent over-
burdening of the court system with "frivolous" lawsuits.' 1 However,
statistics from a United States Department of Justice study show that
the level of citizen suits filed under the Clean Water Act has remained
unchanged in light of the Court's decision in Laidlaw.142 Specifically,
the citizen enforcement cases arising under the Clean Water Act
between 1995 and 1999, as logged by the Department of Justice,
averaged about forty-seven cases a year. 143 After the decision in
Laidlaw in 2000, citizen enforcement cases have averaged about thirty
a year, showing a slight decrease (possibly due to uncertainty as to
how the courts would determine standing under newer case law).144
Furthermore, there is a general recognition that environmental statutes,
especially at the federal level, include citizen suit provisions because
the relevant agencies "lack the ability to enforce all environmental
laws to the maximum extent possible."' 145 While the General Assembly
of Maryland recognized this in the adoption of MESA, 146 the common
law retains a distinct barrier to citizen suits.
138. Id. Enforcement actions were compiled using the Maryland Department of the
Environment's Annual Enforcement and Compliance Reports from 2000 to 2005. See id.
Calculations are approximate, and do not include "Air Quality Complaints." Id. at 50.
139. Id. at 1-2.
140. See Editorial, Air Conditions, BALT. SUN, May 31, 2006, at 14A.
141. See, e.g., A.H. Barnett & Timothy D. Terrell, Economic Observation on Citizen-Suit
Provisions of Environmental Legislation, 12 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 1, 18-19 (2001). See
also Jonathan H. Adler, Stand or Deliver: Citizen Suits, Standing, and Environmental
Protection, 12 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 39,58-59 (2001).
142. Edward Lloyd, Citizen Suits and Defenses against Them, SJ101 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 885,
889 (2004). See also May, supra note 136, at 14-16.
143. Lloyd, supra note 142, at 889.
144. Id.
145. Eileen Guana, Federal Environmental Citizen Provisions: Obstacles and Incentives
on the Road to Environmental Justice, in ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: LAW, POLICY, &
REGULATION, supra note 123, at 289.
146. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
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2. The State of Environmental Justice in Maryland
Environmental Justice in Maryland is slowly pulling itself into
existence after the issuance of President Clinton's Executive Order.
147
In 2003 the Commission on Environmental Justice and Sustainable
Communities (CEJSC) was statutorily created for the purpose of
advising state agencies about environmental justice issues, and for
developing criteria to assess the state of environmental justice in
Maryland. 48 Since that time, the CEJSC has issued several annual
reports, the most recent of which is its 2004 Annual Report.
149
Unfortunately, the 2004 Annual Report only identifies certain
quantitative measures of environmental justice, such as asthma rates
and community demographics, and only a few sample statistics are
available. 1 50
The dearth of local, quantitative information pertaining to
environmental justice makes meaningful illustration of environmental
justice difficult - beyond the case law examples cited above.151
However, anecdotal evidence shows the difficulty that environmental
groups have had in raising claims on behalf of concerned citizens.
One such environmental crusader is Andrew McCown, director
of Echo Hill Outdoor School, President of the Chester River
Association, and Board Member of the Eastern Shore Land
Conservancy for the past fifteen years.1 52 McCown knows all too well
the uphill battle involved in protecting the environment of Maryland's
Eastern Shore.' 53 McCown explains, for example, the impact that
mercury contaminated fish (Maryland has issued statewide mercury
advisories for rivers and lakes 54) have had on him and the community.
First, mercury advisories forced Echo Hill Outdoor School to curtail
the portions of its experiential learning curriculum that include
catching and eating fish, while concerned parents have also removed
147. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
148. MD. CODE ANN., ENVIR. § 1-701(h) (1993).
149. MARYLAND STATE COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE AND SUSTAINABLE
COMMUNITIES, 2004 ANN. REP. 1 (n.d.), available at http://www.mde.state.md.us/Programs/
MultimediaPrograms/EnvironmentalJustice.
150. See generally id.
151. See supra Part IV.B.
152. Interview with Andrew and Betsy McCown, Directors Echo Hill Outdoor School, in
Betterton, MD (Feb. 26, 2006) (on file with author).
153. Id.
154. See, e.g., U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, 2004 NATIONAL LISTING OF FISH
ADVISORIES 3 (2005), available at http://epa.gov/waterscience/fish/advisories/fs2004.pdf.
2006]
512 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS
their children from the program. 155 Second, mercury from Maryland
fish may bio-accumulate in consumers outside the state because fish
that are caught in the Chesapeake Bay are often shipped out of state
(as far as Chicago and Boston), and usually contain no mercury
advisories in the commercial marketplace. 156 Finally, most of the types
of fish caught in the Chester River for commercial sale (i.e., white
perch, yellow perch, and catfish), and which are increasingly
contaminated with mercury, are inexpensive fish that are commonly
consumed by the economically-disadvantaged. 157
Under Maryland's standing laws, it is difficult for an individual
to establish a "direct injury" in such situations. Even for a local
consumer of fish from Eastern Shore markets, it is hard to create the
nexus between mercury ingestion and a questionable permit originally
issued to a point-source polluter in another part of the state. Moreover,
the hurdles that an association must overcome in order to bring suit in
an environmental claim often leave community groups powerless to
address such problems. In an interview, for instance, McCown stated
the following: "often people come to the Chester River Association
with a complaint about something that is beinf done and ask us what
we can do. All I can say is, legally, nothing." 58 Other environmental
leaders have attempted litigation only to be faced with disappointment.
Drew Koslow, of the South River Association, testified before the
General Assembly Senatorial Committee on Education, Health, and
Environmental Affairs that his organization spent over $14,000 in
legal fees trying to seek judicial review of a decision that would affect
two linear miles of the South River. 159 At the end of the day, the
organization was found to lack standing to seek judicial review and
was out $14,000.160
At the time of this writing, the General Assembly had several
bills before the floor that would amend the Environmental Title of the
Maryland Code. 161 Chief among these is Senate Bill 589, which would




159. Judicial Review of Permits: Hearing on S.B. 589 Before the S. Comm. on Education,
Health, and Environmental Affairs, 2006 Leg., 421st Gen. Assem. (Md. 2006) (statement of
Drew Koslow).
160. Id.
161. See infra note 162 and accompanying text. Other bills that address standing in the
421st General Assembly of Maryland are Board of Appeals or Zoning Action - Appeals to
Courts, H.B. 88, 2006 Leg., 421st Gen. Assem. (Md. 2006) (Sponsored by Delegate Smigiel),
and Local Government-Zoning Regulations and Building Permits-Appeals-Neighboring
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apply the Article III language found in the Ambient Air Quality
Control title to section 5-204 of the Environmental Title.' 62 Section 5-
204 covers a broad array of environmental provisions, as discussed
above. 163 Adopting the Article III standing requirements to this section
would be a positive start in the right direction that would make
Maryland's standing law roughly analogous to Virginia's. However,
more should be done.
For example, with the recent addition of Justice Alito to the
Supreme Court, the General Assembly should consider codifying the
federal standard as it exists today to prevent the new language (which
simply adopts "federal constitutional law" requirements) from
changing with future Supreme Court decisions. Alternatively, to
placate the Maryland Court of Appeals, the General Assembly should
consider amending the faulty language of MESA to explicitly provide
for "judicial review." Furthermore, while amending section 5-204 of
the Environmental Title would canvas a broad range of agency actions,
there are still many areas of the Environmental Code that would
remain unchanged. Therefore, these other sections need to be
excavated, examined, and possibly amended as well.
VI. CONCLUSION
Increased standing is the necessary next step in environmental
litigation in Maryland. By setting the bar higher than the federal level
and the level of other states, Maryland courts deny its citizens an
important tool to ensure that agencies properly enforce the statutes
under which they operate. Furthermore, lack of effective associational
standing creates a barrier to many citizens who have no choice but to
let unwanted and harmful development encroach upon their
neighborhoods. Though the needs of modern life require the existence
of certain polluting entities, a fair requirement for standing would
ensure for a citizen of an economically depressed area the same legal
voice as a citizen of a more affluent neighborhood.
Associations, H.B. 155, 2006 Leg., 421st Gen. Assem. (Md. 200b) (Sponsored by DelegaLe
Costa).
162. Environment-Judicial Review of Permit-Standing, S.B. 589, 421st Gen. Assem.
(Md. 2006) (Sponsored by Senators Frosh, Britt, Conway, Green, Grosfeld, Pinsky and
Ruben).
163. See supra Part IV.A.1.
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